Commissioner of Taxation v Aid/Watch Incorporated is the latest of a series of recent cases in which the High Court of Australia has exhibited what might be described as a 'generosity of spirit' to would-be taxpayers whose charitable status has been called into question. In Aid/Watch, the Court ruled that an organisation formed to monitor and evaluate the delivery of foreign aid by Australian government agencies was a charity even though it was engaged, consistently with its objects, in the sorts of political activities that traditionally have been regarded as anathema to charity. This article considers where we might feasibly locate the boundaries of the High Court's reasoning in Aid/Watch, in light of charity law as a whole. In other words, as a matter of charity law, what are the limits of Aid/Watch? Thinking about this question demands: (a) some understanding of what the High Court in Aid/Watch said with certainty; and (b) a wider review of charity law to see which of its rules and principles may bear upon cases about political purposes now that Aid/Watch has been decided.
Introduction
Charity law is in many ways the centrepiece of civil society regulation in Australia. But at the same time as our understanding of civil society has deepened, and the political, social, economic and cultural setting in which civil society activity is undertaken has changed, charity law in Australia has remained largely the same as it was in the late nineteenth century.
Even as significant reform of charity law has been achieved in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and New Zealand, the Australian legal landscape with respect to charity has been left mostly untouched. Much of the blame for this situation must be laid at the feet of successive governments, which for many years have talked about, but failed to achieve, substantive reform of charity law.
Against this backdrop of longstanding government inaction, recent judicial generosity to charities in Australia is worthy of note. In a trio of cases decided over the past few years, the High Court of Australia has exhibited what might be described as a 'generosity of spirit' to would-be taxpayers whose charitable status has been called into question. In Central Bayside
General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue,
The second clear ruling in Aid/Watch was the narrow ruling that determined the dispute between the Commissioner of Taxation and Aid/Watch: according to the majority, 'the generation by lawful means of public debate … concerning the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty' is a charitable purpose.
11 While this purpose did not meet the description of 'relief of poverty', 'advancement of education' or 'advancement of religion', the majority in Aid/Watch thought that it was nonetheless a purpose 'beneficial to the community' 12 in the sense necessary to bring it within the four-fold taxonomy of types of 
Public debate about governmental activities
The first of these questions relates to the narrow proposition that the majority in Aid/Watch endorsed, which was the proposition that generating public debate about the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty is a charitable purpose. [T]he generation … of public debate … concerning the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty … is a purpose beneficial to the community within the fourth head in Pemsel. … It … is unnecessary for this appeal to determine whether the fourth head encompasses the encouragement of public debate respecting activities of government which lie beyond the first three heads (or the balance of the fourth head) identified in Pemsel and, if so, the range of these activities.
There are several points to make about this passage. First, the majority appeared to accept that generating public debate about governmental activities falling under any of the four heads of charity -'relief of poverty', 'advancement of education', 'advancement of religion', and 'other purposes beneficial to the community' -can be a charitable purpose. This means that entities that seek to contribute to public discussion of governmental activities as diverse as the provision of social welfare, the funding of non-government schools, and state sponsorship of faith-based organisations should feel confident that they are within the realms of the charitable in light of Aid/Watch. But secondly, the majority expressed caution about endorsing as charitable contributions to public debate about governmental activities that are not themselves charitable within the taxonomy laid out in Pemsel.
This leads to a third point, which is best expressed as a question. Assuming that the caution exhibited by the majority in the passage quoted above is well-founded, how is a distinction to be drawn between governmental activities that are charitable within Lord Macnaghten's taxonomy, and governmental activities that are not so charitable? The answer to this question turns, of course, on the scope of the 'fourth head' of charity, 'other purposes beneficial to the community'. The scope of the 'fourth head' is famously obscure. On the one hand, there is authority for the proposition that a purpose may be charitable under the 'fourth head' only where it is analogous to an established charitable purpose, or even only where it is analogous to a purpose listed in the preamble to the Statute of cases without considering the merits or otherwise of law reform, the majority in Aid/Watch has ensured that courts may continue to steer clear of such controversy notwithstanding that the rule against political purposes has been repealed.
Rather than taking the view that generating public debate about governmental activities is charitable because of any effect it might have on those activities, the majority in Aid/Watch considered that generating public debate about governmental activities is apt to produce public benefit because of its effects on the political culture of liberal democracy in Australia.
So much was clear from the majority's discussion of the importance of freedom of political expression to the system of government established under the Commonwealth Constitution.
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If it is the effects of public debate on political culture, and not on governmental activities, that matter, then it is difficult to see why courts in cases like Aid/Watch ought to be concerned about the character of the governmental activities that are subject to public debate when determining whether or not generating the public debate in question is a charitable purpose.
And this is why, in Aid/Watch, the majority's caution about the scope of its narrow ruling might have been misplaced.
Public debate and public benefit
To find the limits of Aid/Watch, then, it is necessary to consider the possible effects that public debate about governmental activities might have on political culture, which leads to the second question that I think may arise for consideration in the future in light of In cases about purposes under the 'head' of 'advancement of religion', courts usually presume public benefit but sometimes demand that it be established on the 28 [2010] HCA 42, [44] - [45] . 29 The Court was divided as to the circumstances in which the purpose of contributing to public debate on governmental activities may benefit the public. Heydon J did not address the question of public benefit in his dissenting judgment, but his reasons rested in large measure on the conceptual point that an entity cannot 'generate public debate' by seeking to impose its view on others, as opposed to contributing to public debate in a discursive way, by inviting or joining a public conversation. 35 In light of this conceptual analysis, it is reasonable to attribute to Heydon J the view that the public benefit test is met only in circumstances where an entity has the purpose of contributing to public debate in a way that does not entail 'campaigning' or 'activism'. The other dissenter, Kiefel J, addressed the question of public benefit squarely: for Kiefel J, 'reaching a conclusion of public benefit may be difficult where the activities of an organisation largely involve the assertion of its views'. 36 This does not rule out a finding of public benefit in respect of a purpose of 'campaigning' or 'activism' about governmental activities, but it certainly expresses considerable scepticism about the possibility of such a finding.
In contrast, the majority in Aid/Watch was prepared to recognise 'campaigning' and 'activism' about governmental activities as contributions to public debate that are capable of satisfying the public benefit test of charity law. In my view, the majority expressed this quite clearly. The majority referred to the view of Dixon J, set out in the earlier case of Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General for New South Wales, that 'when the main purpose of a trust is agitation for legislative or political change, it is difficult for the law to find the necessary tendency to the public welfare'. 37 The majority went on to discuss the freedom of political expression that is instrumental to the operation of the system of government established by the Commonwealth Constitution, 38 before making the following statement. The system of law which applies in Australia thus postulates for its operation the very 'agitation' for legislative and political changes of which Dixon J spoke in Royal North Shore Hospital. … [I]t is the operation of these constitutional processes which contributes to the public welfare.
I believe that this part of the majority's reasoning reveals that the majority clearly accepted that contributions to public debate about governmental activities, answering the description of 'agitation', may satisfy the public benefit test. And 'agitation' seems to contemplate precisely the 'campaigning' and 'activism' that so bothered Heydon J and Kiefel J.
When it comes to future cases in which entities have the purpose of contributing to public debate about governmental activities, the limits of Aid/Watch will ultimately turn on what the judges deciding those cases, and the legislators crafting a statutory definition of charity for
Commonwealth law, think about the value, in a liberal democracy, of political expression taking the form of 'campaigning' or 'activism'. This question has troubled even political philosophers, 40 so there is no reason to think that judges or legislators will find it easy to answer, or that all judges and legislators will answer it in the same way. 41 That said, as I noted above there is considerable support in the judgment of the majority in Aid/Watch for an expansive view of the range of contributions to public debate that might satisfy the public benefit test, even where those contributions are characterised by what Heydon J described as 'rancour and asperity'.
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A third type of case is the case where an entity has the purpose of lobbying government with respect to governmental activities. It is highly unlikely that such a purpose is charitable in law, even in light of Aid/Watch, because lobbying, as opposed to facilitating or contributing to public debate, is highly unlikely to satisfy the public benefit test. Of course, a distinction must be drawn between an entity that has the purpose of lobbying government, and an entity that has a charitable purpose (say, 'advancement of religion') and engages in lobbying in a way that is ancillary to that charitable purpose. The latter type of case has never presented a problem, even where the rule against political purposes has been applied, because, as a matter of charity law, charities have always been free to engage in political activities in support of charitable purposes. 43 I say, 'as a matter of charity law', because there may well be public policy considerations against permitting even such ancillary lobbying, considerations that have to do with maintaining and strengthening democratic institutions and practices. 44 However, those considerations, which are not specific to lobbying by charities, are for another day. For the moment, I simply wish to note that in the former type of case -the case where an entity's primary purpose is lobbying government -it is difficult to see how the public benefit test could be satisfied given that the purpose entails private communications between the entity in question and government.
Finally, consider a fourth type of case. This is the case where an entity has the purpose of forming or supporting a political party. Although the case law reveals that courts have occasionally tolerated such a purpose, the prevailing view has been that party political purposes cannot be charitable. 45 This view has probably survived Aid/Watch, but it is not
entirely clear on what basis it might rest now that the rule against political purposes has been repealed. To my mind, there are two possibilities. First, it might be thought that the purpose of forming or supporting a political party does not satisfy the public benefit test, because the aim of a political party is to acquire power through forming or participating in government.
This proposition lacks attraction. Putting simplistic cynical impressions of party politics to one side, if the most that could be said about political parties in Australia were that the aim of such parties is to acquire power, our political system would be sadly broken. Surely political parties are formed and maintained for a variety of purposes, including facilitating political expression and participation and contributing to public debate on a range of matters relating to government. Arguably, then, in a post-Aid/Watch world, forming or supporting a political party may satisfy the public benefit test of charity law because it is a purpose that either answers the description of 'generating public debate about the activities of government' or is analogous to purposes of that description such that it too satisfies the public benefit test. 46 A second possibility is that forming or supporting a political party is not a charitable purpose in Australian law even if it yields public benefit, on public policy grounds. I am not sure what those grounds might be: indeed, at a time when encouraging political participation is one of the great challenges that face liberal democratic states, it might be thought that the policy considerations militate in favour of viewing the formation or support of political parties as charitable. But whatever the policy grounds for the persistence of a rule against party politics in charity law, courts in future cases, as well as legislators, may have to grapple with them now that the rule against political purposes has been repealed. Interestingly, the status of party political purposes was raised during argument in Aid/Watch, and some members of the Court seemed far from convinced that because of public policy considerations such purposes cannot be charitable. 47 However, no trace of this line of thinking survived in the judgments of the Court.
Conclusion
The long days of government inaction on the reform of charity law may finally be drawing to 
